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LABOR RELATIONS AND LABOR LAW IN JAPAN 
Atsushi Tsuneki and Manabu Matsunaka† 
Abstract: This article builds on a rationalistic understanding of Japanese 
employment customs to argue that, up until the 1990s, Japanese labor law facilitated 
private bargaining instead of engineering a desired outcome directly through legal 
regulations.  Through this indirect approach toward labor relations, at least part of 
Japanese labor law made a highly positive contribution to the attainment of economic 
efficiency.  After the 1990s, the merits of Japanese employment customs diminished and 
needed reform.  While such reforms were made in some aspects, Japanese labor law has 
taken the stance of directly regulating the economy, particularly in the area of 
employment protection and working hours regulation at this stage.  Due to this 
mismatched regulatory approach toward Japanese employment relations, Japanese labor 
law has hindered the performance of the Japanese economy. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
This article argues that Japanese employment customs developed 
naturally through an agreement among the members of the Japanese 
employment system, and attained efficient economic performance up until 
the 1990s.  During that time, Japanese labor law mainly worked toward 
facilitating private bargaining instead of engineering the desired result 
directly through legal regulations.  Through this indirect approach toward 
labor relations, at least part of Japanese labor law made a highly positive 
contribution to the attainment of economic efficiency.   
After the 1990s, when long run stagnation occurred in the Japanese 
economy, the merits of Japanese employment customs diminished and 
needed reform.  At this stage, some aspects of Japanese labor law began to 
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adopt a more market friendly approach to cope with this change.  However, 
in some other important aspects, the law took the stance of directly 
regulating the economy, particularly in the area of employment protection 
and working hours.  This approach was the exact opposite of the 
deregulation that was necessary to recover the efficiency of the Japanese 
economy after the 1990s.  Due to this mismatched regulatory approach, 
Japanese labor law has hindered the performance of the Japanese economy. 
The Japanese economy has provided economists with many puzzles.  
It possesses various apparently unique properties, such as the main bank 
system, mutual share holdings among group companies in the capital 
market, vertical relationship among firms (keiretsu), 1  and various 
interventions by the bureaucracy in the market economy.2  A conspicuous 
example is the so-called Japanese employment custom, which is usually 
characterized by permanent employment and seniority.3  
Although standard neo-classical economics may regard Japanese 
employment customs as a source of inefficiency counter to free competition 
in the labor market,4 this argument is unable to explain why post-war Japan 
succeeded economically at least until the 1980s.  
 Since the late 1980s, many economists have argued that a series of 
properties shown by the Japanese economy should be understood as a 
rational and efficient system that supported the economic success of post-
war Japan.5  In the area of labor relations, Koike argues that the apparently 
                                           
1
 For the nature and functions of the Japanese main bank system, see Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick 
& Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK 
SYSTEM 3 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).  For a summary of the characteristics of Japanese 
enterprises, including keiretsu and so-called Japanese employment system, see D. Eleanor Westney, 
Japanese Enterprise Faces the Twenty-First Century, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 105, 106-35 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001). 
2
 Basic observations on the Japanese industrial policy were surveyed in TAKATOSHI ITOH, THE 
JAPANESE ECONOMY 196-205 (1992).  Recently, there have been discussions that cast doubt on the efficacy 
and even presence of systems that are said to be peculiar to Japan, including the main bank and bureaucracy 
led industrial policy.  See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of Keiretsu, 11 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 169 (2002) (arguing that keiretsu has no substance and hence cannot be a characteristic 
of Japanese economy); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter?: The Myth 
of the Japanese Main Bank, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 261, 272-99 (2005) (arguing that none of the 
features of so called main bank system are empirically supported). 
3
 See, e.g., Kenichi Imai & Ryutaro Komiya, Characteristics of Japanese Firms, in BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: VIEWS OF LEADING JAPANESE ECONOMISTS 19, 23 (Kenichi Imai & Ryutaro Komiya 
eds., 1994). 
4
 See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 163 (2d ed. 2000). 
5
 See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Toward An Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1 (1990) (a survey of economic analysis of Japanese firms); THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF 
JAPAN (Ryūtarō Komiya, Masahiro Okuno & Kotarō Suzumura eds., Kazuo Satō trans., 1988) (providing 
an economic analysis of Japanese industrial policy). 
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group-oriented nature of Japanese labor relations and organizations can be 
naturally understood as a superior economic system in adjusting to an 
uncertain and changing economic environment. 6   Some game-theoretic 
contributions argue that labor relations in both the United States and Japan 
can be characterized as two possibly efficient equilibria of the same game 
played by similarly rational players facing different institutional 
environments.7 
Building on this rationalistic understanding of Japanese employment 
customs, this article discusses the relationship between Japanese labor law 
and employment customs.  It addresses the question of whether Japanese 
labor law enforced the establishment of Japanese employment customs, or 
whether it adjusted itself to the already established system in the process of 
post-war economic development in Japan.  This article simultaneously 
considers whether or not the Japanese labor law enhanced the efficiency of 
the system, both in the economic growth process until the 1980s and the 
stagnation period that began in the 1990s and has continued until now.  
The remaining part of this article is organized as follows.  Part II, of 
the article clarifies the contents of Japanese employment customs, referring 
to major empirical research, and presents the theoretical arguments that 
support the customs’ economic rationality.  Part III describes the historical 
outline of Japanese labor law, its basic principles, and the various aspects of 
Japanese labor law in general.  Part IV.A. justifies our argument that 
Japanese labor law made highly positive contributions to the establishment 
of efficient Japanese labor relations. Part IV.B. discusses the rational 
adjustment of Japanese labor law to the structural change the Japanese 
economy underwent after the 1990s.  Part IV.C. refers to the recent 
development of regulations in Japanese labor law.  Part V summarizes the 
overall discussions and provides some remarks on the future of Japanese 
labor relations and labor law.  
                                           
6
 See KAZUO KOIKE, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK IN JAPAN 63-68 (1996). 
7
 See Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Monitoring Cost, Agency Relationship and Equilibrium Modes of 
Labor Contract, 1 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 147 (1987); Yoshitsugu Kanemoto & W. Bentley MacLeod, 
The Theory of Contracts and Labor Practices in Japan and the United States, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION 
ECON. 159 (1991).  See also MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES AND BARGAINING IN THE 
JAPANESE ECONOMY 49 (1988) (providing an economic analysis of Japanese firms). 
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II. JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT CUSTOM: FACT AND THEORY 
A. Fact Findings 
The Japanese employment custom (“JEC”) can be observed at least in 
some part, in the United States and Europe, particularly in certain large and 
established companies. 8   Therefore, it is difficult to define the precise 
characteristics of Japanese employment customs that are unique to Japan.  
However, several distinctive findings concerning the JEC have been 
reported for companies in Japan.  First, a long-term employment relationship 
(“LTER”) occurs more in Japan than other developed countries.  The 
tendency for long-term employment exists in some European countries such 
as Germany or France, and even in the large United States companies.9  
However, empirical research shows that on average, Japanese workers stay 
in the same firm for longer periods than American workers, and that the 
turnover rate of the former was lower.10   
Second, in Japan, white-collar, and at least some blue-collar workers 
are embraced within the same system of long-term employment and career 
formation based on seniority and merit ratings.11  They experience a wider 
range of mutually related jobs than workers in other countries.  At the same 
time, job demarcation is more ambiguous.  The delegation of de facto 
authority descends to the lower tiers of the production hierarchy, so that 
workers have a chance to utilize their first-hand knowledge in an attempt to 
improve the production system of their workplace. 12   The older skilled 
workers actively provide on-the-job training to the younger unskilled 
workers.13 
                                           
8
 See, e.g., KOIKE, supra note 6, at 40-41 (indicating that lifetime employment can be observed in 
the United States and in Western Europe); Westney, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing similarities and 
differences between Japan and other developed countries on employment systems including lifetime 
employment). 
9
 Id. 
10
 See Masanori Hashimoto & John Raisian, Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan 
and the United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 721, 722-28 (1985).  See also D.H. WHITTAKER, MANAGING 
INNOVATION: A STUDY OF BRITISH AND JAPANESE FACTORIES (1990) (providing a comparison between 
Japan and the United Kingdom). 
11
 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 34-41. 
12
 See James R. Lincoln, Mitsuyo Hanada & Kerry McBride, Organization Structures in Japanese 
and U.S. Manufacturing, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 338 (1986).  See also James R. Lincoln & Kerry McBride, 
Japanese Industrial Organization in Comparative Perspective, 13 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 289 (1987). 
13
  Therefore, labor contracts for regular (typical) workers in Japan do not include explicit agreements 
on job contents.  See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 50-61, 66-72.  In contrast, in the United States, labor contracts 
explicitly specify the kind of job and its performance standards.  See PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. 
PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 42-56 (1971).  
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Third, the wage payment system is also common with white-collar 
and blue-collar workers.14  Wage is determined by seniority and promotion 
to the higher-ranking hierarchy, which depends on merit assessments, but 
wage level is only remotely related to job type.15  Most empirical research 
shows that merit assessments are more important than seniority in this 
process, and the lifetime earning differences among workers are rather large 
despite the appearance of egalitarianism. 16   Some believe that seniority 
mattered more than merit in the Japanese system of remuneration. This 
mistake is based on the fact that the link between short-run performance and 
payment to workers is weak and the speed of worker promotion is slow.  In 
reality, the difference of lifetime income among workers is high due to 
difference in speed of promotion.17  The speed depends on the assessment of 
merit by the central personnel department, which makes the department 
powerful.18  
Although the features explained above in relation to Japanese firms 
broadly apply to white-collar workers in large companies in the United 
States and Europe, they are characteristics of Japan in that this system is 
extended to blue-collar workers.19 
Fourth, labor unions are not industry-based unions as in the Western 
countries, but company-based ones. 20   The labor union has a long-term 
relationship with the employer and represents all workers of an enterprise, 
including both white-collar and blue-collar workers.21  The management of 
the firm is chiefly determined by inner promotion, and those selected for the 
                                           
14
 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 26. 
15
 See Hashimoto & Raisian, supra note 10, at 728-32; Arne L. Kalleberg & James R. Lincoln, The 
Structure of Earnings Inequality in the United States and Japan, 94 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY S121, S140-S145 
(1988). 
16
 See Toshiaki Tachibanaki, The Determination of the Promotion Process in Organizations and of 
Earnings Differentials, 8 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 603 (1987); Toshiaki Tachibanaki, Education, 
Occupation, Hierarchy and Earnings, 7 ECON. EDUC. REV. 221 (1988) (empirical research showing that 
promotion and associated increase of earnings differentials are more dependent on evaluation than 
seniority); Hiroyuki Fujimura, Seiseki Satei no Kokusai Hikaku [International Comparison of Merit 
Ratings], 362 NIHON RŌDŌ KYŌKAI ZASSHI 26 (1989) (showing that wage increase is rather inelastic to 
seniority).  
17
 See, e.g., Andrew Weiss, Simple Truths of Japanese Manufacturing, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul.-Aug. 
1984, at 119. 
18
  These features are also pointed out as part of common structures of the Japanese employment 
system.  See, e.g., John O. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms Really 
Changing Japan?, 19 J. JAPAN L. 5, 15 (2005). 
19
 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 13-27. 
20
 See ITO, supra note 2, at 226; TAKASHI ARAKI, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN JAPAN 164-65 
(2002). 
21
 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 212-16. 
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management usually have some experience in labor union activities. 22  
Therefore, management and labor are more likely to have common interests, 
and the labor union has indirect power to influence the management 
decisions through discussions between labor and management.23 
Fifth, there are many non-regular workers (atypical workers) such as 
part-time workers and dispatched workers that are differentiated from 
regular workers in promotion, payment, and employment guarantee. 24  
Therefore, the Japanese labor market has a dual nature, wherein the part of 
the market that consists of regular workers is internalized within the firm, 
while non-regular workers participate in an outside spot market and engage 
in more frequent career turnovers.  Note that this dual nature is universally 
observed in developed capitalist countries.25  However, it is characteristic of 
the Japanese economy to clearly distinguish regular and non-regular workers 
at the time of hiring.26 
These five properties depict the group-oriented nature of the JEC, 
which some argue arises from the group-oriented culture of Japan.27  Also, 
some scholars have explained JEC by using cultural or comparative-
sociological approaches such as amae (dependence) or Confucianism where 
the nature of the JEC is attributed to the mentality or spiritual tradition 
inherent in Japan.28  However, these culture-based explanations of Japanese 
industrial relations are inconclusive because elements of the JEC exist in all 
developed capitalist countries.  
The cultural theories are also questionable from a historical point of 
view.  The customs discussed did not exist from the beginning of the 
                                           
22
 See, e.g., Hiroyuki Fujimura, Keieisha no Kyaria to Hōshū no Jittai [The State of the Career and 
Payment of Managers], in GENDAI NIHON NO KŌPORĒTO GABANANSU [CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
MODERN JAPAN] 135, 145-47 (Takeshi Inagami & Rengō Sōgō Seikatsu Kaihatsu Kenkyūsho eds., 2000). 
23
 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 195-216 (a detailed international comparison of the functions of the 
labor union and its performance evaluations). 
24
 Recently the percentage of these atypical workers has been increasing, particularly in the service 
sector.  See, e.g., Ryūichi Yamakawa, Labor Law Reform in Japan: A Response to Recent Socio-Economic 
Changes, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 627, 628-29 (2001). 
25
 See DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 13, at 164-83 (discussing the existence and economic 
implications of the dual labor market in the United States). 
26
 See Yamakawa, supra note 24, at 629. 
27
 See, e.g., JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK JR., KAISHA: THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 198-
99 (1985). 
28
 See, e.g., id. at 198; RONALD DORE, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY (1987) (stressing the contribution 
of Confucianism to the Japanese system of enterprise and society); MICHIO MORISHIMA, WHY HAS JAPAN 
SUCCEEDED? WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE JAPANESE ETHOS (1982) (analyzing the effect of 
Confucianism adapted to Japan on the economic development of Japan since the Meiji Restoration).  For 
the brief summary of the cultural theory of Japanese industrial relations, see MARCUS REBICK, THE 
JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM: ADAPTING TO A NEW ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 17-18 (2005). 
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Japanese economy.29  Broad economic regulations to reinforce a planned 
economy during World War II formed the basis of JEC and were maintained 
through a democratization program by the Allied High Command that 
strengthened the position of laborers during the occupation era.30  Japanese 
management retained this method from Japan’s high growth period until the 
1980s.  Before the 1940s, the Japanese economy had a classical market 
system with a competitive labor market that facilitated the highly frequent 
turnover of workers.  The possibility of permanent employment and 
participation of labor in management was very limited, and labor unions 
were industry-based, not enterprise-based unions, as observed in other 
developed countries.31 
B. Appraisal from the Theoretical Point of View 
The JEC is usually characterized by its egalitarianism based on the 
LTER and the seniority system in place with respect to promotion and 
remuneration. 32   However, in reality, the process of promotion and 
remuneration is far more meritocratic than it appears, based on the 
assessments of the employer.  In addition, on-the-job training (“OJT”) 
activity is linked to the process of frequent rotations to accumulate workers’ 
firm specific human capital.33 
 Production systems do not only deal with routine work, even if it 
appears to be a highly technological process that should be optimized with 
respect to engineering methods.34  There are always uncertain accidents, 
demand shocks, or technological innovations that require adjustments in the 
production system.  Human capital and termed intellectual skills become 
                                           
29
 See, e.g., Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm Under the Wartime Planned Economy, in THE 
JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 350, 357-59 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore 
eds., 1994) (empirically showing that lifetime employment was not prevalent in prewar Japan compared to 
postwar).  
30
 See, e.g., id. at 369-70; WILLIAM. B. GOULD, JAPAN’S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 17-
43 (1984).  Fierce confrontation between labor and management in the post war period ended and the 
relationship between them largely turned into cooperative one.  See generally ANDREW GORDON, THE 
WAGES OF AFFLUENCE: LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1998). 
31
 See generally Walter Galenson & Konosuke Odaka, The Japanese Labor Market, in ASIA’S NEW 
GIANT: HOW THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 587, 614-16 (Hugh Patrick & Henry Rosovsky eds., 1976) 
(detailing the labor market situation in Japan before the 1940s).  See also ANDREW GORDON, THE 
EVOLUTION OF LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN (1985) (survey on the historical development of Japanese labor 
relations).  
32
 See, e.g., ITOH, supra note 2, at 210-13 (summarizing this conventional wisdom for Japanese 
industrial relations). 
33
 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 54-60 (explaining OJT and job rotations of Japanese firms in detail). 
34
 See id. at 63. 
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necessary to deal with this problem.35 Japanese OJT requires workers to train 
in a broad class of jobs thereby encouraging the development of this type of 
knowledge.36  
 Such a system succeeds only when workers are offered incentives for 
making efforts to accumulate strictly firm-specific intellectual skills 
including the willingness to rotate among various types of jobs depending on 
the economic environment or the process of OJT, and the willingness of 
senior workers to accept and train young workers on the job.  According to 
the classical human capital theory, a competitive labor market does not 
ensure an efficient level of investment in firm-specific human capital. 37  
Owing to the firm-specific nature, firms do not have an incentive to pay for 
workers’ investment effort, and given this expectation, workers lose their 
incentive to invest.  Even explicit contractual arrangements cannot solve the 
problem due to the problem of third-party verifiability.38  As courts cannot 
observe the level of human capital investment, a worker will not invest if he 
is paid prior to investment: further, he will be less motivated to invest as he 
cannot rely on a firm’s promise to pay later for the same reason of 
verifiability. 
To solve this problem, it is necessary to provide incentives for 
workers to invest and for firms to pay appropriately for the workers’ efforts:  
i.e. the LTER should be a self-enforcing implicit contract that does not 
involve verifiability problems.  Several features of the JEC listed in the 
previous section can be understood as a system to provide incentives for 
workers to invest in human capital. 
One important trait of the Japanese LTER is that wages are not 
observably elastic to observable measure in the short term.  Namely, under 
the LTER most of the wages are not related to performance indices such as 
output, sales, or profits. At first glance linking wages to those indices seems 
to stimulate worker efforts.  But there is a large shortcoming in that such 
wages encourage workers to improve only their short-run performance, 
without being interested in the accumulation of intellectual skills that are 
                                           
35
 See id. at 63-68. 
36
 See id. at 68-72, 241-59. 
37
 See, e.g., Jacob Mincer, Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution, 66 J. 
POL. ECON. 281 (1958); Jacob Mincer, On-the-Job Training: Costs, Returns and Some Implications, 70 J. 
POL. ECON. 50 (1962); GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (2d ed. 1975). 
38
 This is a basic problem dealt with by the incomplete contract theory.  See Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988). 
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useful in the long-run.39  In addition, incentive pay does not work when the 
observable performance measures that are linked to the compensation do not 
completely reflect the efforts of workers and the direct monitoring of 
workers is not very expensive.  These two conditions apply to Japanese 
organizations in which the group production system is developed and in 
which the management is more concerned with long-term efficiency.  These 
are the main reasons that this type of short-run incentive pay has not 
prevailed in Japan.40  
Under the JEC, companies provide the incentive to work hard and 
train through the promotion process and the associated increase in wages 
that occurs in the long run.  As explained in the previous section, merit 
assessment matters more than seniority, and the lifetime earning differences 
among workers are considerably large.41  This process can be interpreted as a 
type of tournament wherein firms are committed to the lifetime employment 
of workers and their appropriate remuneration.42 
Unfortunately, this system has a disadvantage in that it may protect 
against the moral hazard that firms renege on the wage payment to workers 
who do make sufficient efforts.  As the amount of effort and wage which 
should be paid for that effort cannot be completely verified, the firm has an 
incentive to cut the wages of workers, although their job performance and 
accumulation of firm specific human capital are sufficient.  Owing to this 
absence of credibility, workers are not willing to invest in human capital, 
and the LTER fails.  
To rectify this disadvantage, this implicit contract should be enforced 
through the bargaining between the employer and the labor union.  Here, 
                                           
39
 See Hideshi Itoh, Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive 
Theory, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 233, 240-57 (Masahiko Aoki & 
Ronald Dore eds., 1994) (arguing that the Japanese system of human resource allocation and remuneration 
is both rational and efficient). 
40
 In other developed countries such as the United States, it is also known that the remuneration 
system is not very elastic to the short-run performance indices, at least for large companies and with the 
exception of executive compensation, although this tendency is not as conspicuous as in the case of Japan.  
However, they adopt a different system of remuneration from Japan in that wages are directly attached to 
jobs instead of individuals.  See DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 13, at 65-71.  This system of wages 
determined by the type and difficulty of jobs also works as a strong incentive device to increase workers’ 
efforts, since this system works as a tournament among workers for the limited number of good positions.  
For a theoretical analysis of this type of economy, see Lorne Carmichael, Firm-Specific Human Capital 
and Promotion Ladders, 14 BELL J. ECON. 251 (1983); James. M. Malcomson, Work Incentives, Hierarchy, 
and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 486 (1984); W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 
Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment, 96 J. POL. ECON. 832 (1988). 
41
 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
42
 See Kanemoto & MacLeod, supra note 7; Yoshitsugu Kanemoto & W. Bentley MacLeod, Firm 
Reputation and Self-Enforcing Labor Contracts, 6 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 144 (1992). 
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employers must keep their promise of remuneration in order to protect their 
reputation because they fear that labor unions will retaliate in the future by 
not cooperating with the management.43  For example, they might go on a 
strike or bargain for a higher wage increase or better working conditions in 
the following year’s negotiations.   
C. Interpretation of JEC and Some Other Implications Derived from 
Economic Theory 
  The theoretical analysis in Part II.B. makes the rationalistic 
interpretation of JEC possible.  Long-term employment and seniority wages 
are devices to provide incentives to workers for the efficient accumulation of 
firm-specific skills,44 and ambiguous job demarcation and the delegation of 
authorities to the lower tiers of production hierarchies are mechanisms for 
facilitating the use of firm-specific skills for the improvement of the 
production system. 45   The intra-firm labor union is used for the 
communication between labor and management, and the negotiation in the 
intra-firm is more important than an industry-wide problem.46  The dual 
nature of the Japanese labor market can be naturally understood as the 
returns provided to the regular workers for their extra effort in investment 
into the firm-specific human capital, which was not necessary for non-
regular workers. 
To explain why certain efficient traits that characterize the Japanese 
LTER are observed in the Western countries, but only for white-collar 
workers in large firms, it is necessary to consider the conditions necessary 
for the bargaining process between labor and management to perform 
effectively.  The coordination of expectations between two players is 
necessary for attaining an efficient reputation equilibrium. 47   More 
concretely, firms should build a reputation that they keep their promises with 
workers. 
                                           
43
 See Kanemoto & MacLeod, supra note 42 (applying the reputation effect to the analysis of 
Japanese firms).  The reputation effect was first put into economic analysis by Klein and Leffler.  Benjamin 
Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. 
ECON. 615 (1981). 
44
 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
45
 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
46
 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
47
 For a general discussion of this issue, see David G. Pearce, Repeated Games: Cooperation and 
Rationality, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS 132 (Jean-Jacques Laffont ed., 
1992); DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 145-200 (1991). 
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This observation seems to imply that the Japanese system of 
employment can only be introduced for the class of workers that is relatively 
protected against the business cycle or technical innovations, since it is for 
this type of workers that firms can keep promises regarding remuneration for 
long time and their words become credible.  It is exactly this class of 
workers that are white-collar in large companies.48 
This theoretical argument further provides some insight on the relative 
decline in the effectiveness of the JEC.  The world economy after the 1990s 
is partly characterized by drastic technological progress, led mainly by the 
development of information technology and financial engineering.49  When 
new businesses and industries came into existence, old technologies became 
obsolete within a short span of time.  As the merit of JEC lies in the 
accumulation of firm-specific knowledge in the long run, it is more effective 
in an economic environment growing at a stable rate and with relatively 
small technical changes.  Japan needs a new system of labor relations and 
labor market to cope with this change.50 
III. STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE LABOR LAW  
A. Historical Origin 
Japanese labor law was not sufficiently developed before World War 
II.  There were several laws that regulated individual labor relations, such as 
protecting minor or female laborers, determining minimum safety standards, 
and number of working hours. 51   There were also laws for regulating 
employment agencies and the requirement of workers’ accident 
compensation insurance.52   In addition, during wartime some laws were 
enacted to control minimum wage53 and work time.54  These laws formed the 
                                           
48
 If firms in other countries do not have a good reputation, workers will strongly oppose the 
introduction of the Japanese system of management, which gives more discretionary power to the 
employers.  See Kanemoto & MacLeod, supra note 42, at 146.  
49
 See REBICK, supra note 28, at 41-42 (discussing this technical change and its effect on the career 
patterns of standard employees in Japan).  For the effect of technical changes on the labor market, see infra 
note 167 and accompanying text. 
50
 See, e.g., id. at 32. 
51
 Kōjōhō, [Factory Law], Law No. 46 of 1911; Kōjōhō Shikōrei [Ordinance for Enforcement of 
Factory Law], Imperial Ordinance No. 193 of 1916.  These were repealed when the Labor Standards Law 
(Rōdō Kijunhō) was enacted in 1947. 
52
 Rōdōsha Saigai Fujohō [Worker’s Injury Assistance Law], Law No. 54 of 1931; Rōdōsha Saigai 
Fujo Hokenhō [Worker’s Injury Assistance Insurance Law], Law No. 54 of 1931. 
53
 Chingin Tōseirei [Wage Control Ordinance], Imperial Ordinance No. 128 of 1937. 
54
 Kōjō Shūgyō Jikanrei [Factory Employment Hours Ordinance], Imperial Ordinance No. 127 of 
1937.  
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basis of the enactment of the post-World-War-II laws, but they were limited 
compared to today’s standards.  Furthermore, labor movements were 
repressed under criminal law, and efforts to legislate labor unions failed until 
the end of the war.55 
The situation changed drastically after the war.  The Allied High 
Command promoted a social policy for protecting workers and their labor 
union activities as a part of its democratization program toward Japan.  The 
Labor Union Law was enacted in 194556 and it was revised in 1949 to its 
present form. 57  At the same time, the union density (rate of the union 
membership among workers) exceeded 50%.58 
In addition, there were changes in the area of individual labor 
relations.  The New Constitution of 1946 established the basic right to work, 
defined the principles for the legislation on labor conditions, 59  and 
guaranteed the right to organize and bargain and act collectively.60  In 1947, 
the Labor Standards Law61 and the Workers’ Accident Compensation Law62 
were promulgated, raising the level of worker protection to International 
Labour Standards of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”).  
Further, the basic laws on unemployment were promulgated during this 
period.63  This basic framework of the Japanese labor law was constructed 
between 1945 and 1955 and survives even today.64 
B. Basic Principles 
For labor contracts, as with other contracts, there is freedom of 
contract and consequently the contract between a worker and an employer is 
                                           
55
 See KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 5-8 (Leo Kanowitz trans., 2002).  
56
 Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor Union Law], Law No. 51 of 1945. 
57
 Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor Union Law], Law No. 174 of 1949.  For a brief summary of the formation 
and amendment of the Labor Union Law in English, see Tetsunari Doko, The Labor Relations Commission 
as an Organization to Resolve Collective Labor Disputes, 3(1) JAPAN LABOR REV. 32, 32-35 (2006). 
58
 KŌSEI RŌDŌSHŌ [MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE], RŌDŌKUMIAI KISO CHŌSA 
JIKEIRETSUHYŌ DAI 1 HYŌ [BASIC SURVEY ON LABOR UNION TABLE 1] (2006) (indicating that in 1947 the 
union density rate had been 45.3% and it increased to 53.0% in the next year.  In 1949, the year in which 
present Labor Union Law was promulgated, the rate rose to 55.8%). 
59
 See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 27 (providing that working standards, 
including wages and rest time, shall be established by law). 
60
 See id. at art. 28. 
61
 Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947.  
62
 Rōdōsha Saigai Hoshō Hokenhō [Workers’ Accident Compensation Law], Law No. 50 of 1947. 
63
 To cope with unemployment caused by deflationary policies under Dodge Line, Unemployment 
Insurance Law was amended and Emergency Countermeasures Law was enacted.  See SUGENO, supra note 
55, at 9-10.  For details of situation of employment in these days, see RŌDŌSHŌ [MINISTRY OF LABOUR], 
SHOWA 24 NEN RŌDŌ KEIZAI NO BUNSEKI [ANALYSIS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1947] ch. 2 (1947).  
64
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 8-10. 
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enforceable.65  In reality, this is not so free as it may first appear.  It is 
commonly explained as follows. Since the bargaining power between 
individual workers and employers is extremely unequal without any 
regulations, labor contracts can be rather unfair and unreasonable in 
determining the terms of working conditions.66  Hence labor laws empower 
workers in many ways in order to facilitate the fairness of the terms of labor 
contracts.67 
Japanese labor law supports laborers in three ways.  First, it provides 
compulsory minimum standards for working conditions such as wages,68 
working hours,69 and safety.70  Second, to facilitate equal bargaining between 
labor and management, it guarantees workers the right to bargain 
collectively by forming unions. 71   Third, to improve the labor market 
mechanism, information and employment placement service is provided by 
public employment agencies,72 and those seeking employment can receive 
subsidies, which includes unemployment benefits.73 
There are also regulations against discriminatory treatments.  Once 
hired, employers may not discriminate against employees for factors such as 
race, sex, or ideology. 74   While discriminatory treatment in general is 
                                           
65
 Freedom of contract is a basic principle of Civil Law.  Without laws modifying or restricting this 
freedom, contracting parties are free to agree upon whatever provisions they want and it will be 
enforceable, as long as it is not against public policy.  See MINPŌ [CIV. C.], art. 90 (providing that contracts 
and other acts should be nullified if against public policy).  Labor laws function as a restriction on this 
freedom. 
66
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 76. 
67
 See id. 
68
 See Saitei Chinginhō [Minimum Wage Law], Law No. 137 of 1959, art. 5, paras. 1, 2.  For details, 
see infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
69
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 32, paras. 1, 2. 
70
 See id. at art. 42; Rōdō Anzen Eiseihō [Labor Safety and Health Law], Law No. 57 of 1982. 
71
 See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 28. Rights and privileges of labor unions 
and duties of employers are provided in the Labor Union Law (Rōdō Kumiaihō).  For example, the law 
provides an exemption from criminal punishment for actions in appropriate strikes.  Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor 
Union Law], Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 1, para. 2.  See also KEIHŌ [PENAL CODE], art. 35.  
72
 See Shokugyō Anteihō [Employment Security Law], Law No. 141 of 1947, art. 5.  Until 1999, 
private employment placement service was strictly restricted to only few jobs, and employment placement 
services were generally provided by governmental agencies.  In the 1999 amendments to the Employment 
Security Law and Worker’s Dispatching Law, this regulation was largely changed to liberalize restrictions 
on private employment placement services and to remove governmental monopolization.  See also Takashi 
Araki, 1999 Revisions of Employment Security Law and Worker Dispatching Law: Drastic Reforms of 
Japanese Labor Market Regulations, 38 (9) JAPAN LABOR BULLETIN 5-12 (1999); Yamakawa, supra note 
24, at 642. 
73
 See generally Koyō Hokenhō [Employment Insurance Law], Law No. 116 of 1974; Rōdō Hoken 
no Hokenryō no Chōshūtō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Law Concerning Collection of Labor Insurance Premium], 
Law No. 84 of 1973. 
74
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, arts. 3, 4 (prohibiting 
discriminatory treatment of employees in general); Koyō no Bunya ni Okeru Danjo no Kintōna Kikai 
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explicitly prohibited only after workers are hired (discrimination at the stage 
of recruitment and hiring is not explicitly restricted), sex discrimination at 
the stage of recruitment and hiring of employees, such as excluding females 
from recruitment, 75  is severely prohibited by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law.76  It has long been argued that Japanese female workers 
are discriminated against in the recruitment process and in their treatment 
within the firm, making them unable to hold regular positions in the LTER.77  
To rectify this situation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law 78  was 
enacted in 1985 and developed to its present form in 1997.79 
C. The Long-Term Employment Relationship and the Protection of 
Employment 
Part II.A. pointed out the fact that the LTER has prevailed in the 
above-middle sized Japanese companies and the features of it.  Due to the 
self-enforcing nature of LTER, a considerable part of the working conditions 
is not explicitly written in individual contracts.80  Therefore, work rules 
                                                                                                                              
Oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Equal Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972, 
arts. 5-9 (prohibiting discrimination by gender). 
75
 See Rōdōsha ni Taisuru Seibetsu wo Riyū to Suru Sabetsu no Kinshitō ni Kansuru Kitei ni 
Sadameru Jikō ni Kanshi, Jigyōnushi ga Tekisetsu ni Taisho Suru Tame no Shishin [Guidelines on 
Appropriate Measures Employers Should Take Concerning Provisions Prohibiting the Sexual 
Discrimination of Workers], 2006 RŌKOKU 164, art. 2, para. 2, item 2. 
76
 Koyō no Bunya ni Okeru Danjo no Kintōna Kikai Oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu 
[Equal Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972, art. 5.  Employers only had duty to make 
efforts to provide women with opportunities equal to men until the 1997 amendments of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law.  For the 1997 amendments, see Yamakawa, supra note 24, at 636-40.  
77
 This difficulty can be explained by using the statistical theory of discrimination. See Edmund 
Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination, 63 AM. ECON. REV 287 (1973).  
78
 Koyō no Bunya ni Okeru Danjo no Kintōna Kikai Oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu 
[Equal Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972. 
79
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 108-22. There has been a steady increase in the share of females 
holding permanent positions in Japanese firms since 1975.  See REBICK, supra note 28, at 113-18, tbl. 7.2.  
80
 See infra Part III.D.  Fixed-term labor contracts are severely restricted in Japan.  Before the 1998 
amendment, article 14 of Labor Standards Law in principle prohibited fixed-term labor contracts that last 
longer than one year.  See Hiroya Nakakubo, The 2003 Revision of the Labor Standards Law: Fixed-Term 
Contracts, Dismissal and Discretionary-Work Schemes, 2(1) JAPAN LABOR REV. 4, 7 (2004).  This 
restriction was said to protect workers from being bound too long and therefore being deprived of their 
freedom to resignation.  See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 188-91.  Since this restriction can be circumvented 
easily and the fear of obligatory servitude has become obsolete, this restriction has been gradually 
liberalized.  See Takashi Araki, Changing Employment Practices, Corporate Governance, and the Role of 
Labor Law in Japan, 28 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y J. 251, 276-77 (2007).  The 1998 amendment made 
certain exceptions,  for certain types of labor contracts, such as scientific research, the maximum period 
may be three years.  See Yamakawa, supra note 24, at 632.  Further, under the 2003 amendment, the 
maximum period for all types of labor contracts became three years.  Also, for certain types of contracts, 
the maximum period was extended from three years to five years.  See KŌSEI ROŌDŌSHŌ [MINISTRY OF 
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(shūgyō kisoku) and collective agreements among union(s) and employer 
(rōdō kyōyaku) become important since they have a function of filling the 
gaps.  
The LTER is a type of labor contract without a fixed term and is 
legally different from a series of contracts that are renegotiated and updated 
every few years.81  Under the Civil Code, both employers and employees can 
terminate this type of labor contract at will with two weeks’ notice.82  Under 
this rule, employers have the freedom to dismiss employees, and workers 
have the freedom to resign. The Labor Standards Law traditionally provided 
few explicit restrictions on dismissal.83  
However, this freedom of dismissal has been strictly restricted under 
the doctrine of abusive dismissal that has been formed by case law and later 
codified in the statutes.  Under the doctrine, employers can dismiss workers 
only when there are reasonable and objective grounds to do so. 84   For 
example, a dismissal based simply on the subjective sentiment of the 
employer is not allowed under this principle. 
When the decision of dismissal is judged illegal, the employer is 
compelled to continue the employment relationship.85  Moreover, because 
the labor contract relationship continues during the period between the 
invalid dismissal and the judgment voiding the dismissal, workers can claim 
the wages for this period.86 
The doctrine, originally developed in cases of disciplinary dismissals, 
was extended to the cases of adjustment dismissals during the recession, 
particularly after the 1973 Oil Shock.87  This was the time when the Japanese 
                                                                                                                              
HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE], KAISEI RŌDŌ KIJUNHŌ NO GAIYŌ [SUMMARY OF AMENDED LABOR 
STANDARDS LAW] 2 (2003), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/2003/11/dl/tp1111-1a.pdf. 
81
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 14, para. 1. 
82
 MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 627, para. 1. 
83
 E.g., Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 19 (prohibiting dismissal 
during periods of leave by maternity or by injury or illness caused by work). See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 
474. 
84
 See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Apr. 25, 1975, 29 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 456, 457 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 31, 1977, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17, 18 (Japan). 
85
 See Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 16.  This does not 
always mean that employers will actually put the abusively dismissed worker in the position the worker had 
assumed before.  Rather, it protects workers because the employer must pay wages as long as the labor 
contract is in effect.  See Ryūichi Yamakawa, Nihon no Kaikohōsei [Japanese Law of Dismissal], in 
KAIKOHŌSEI WO KANGAERU [EXAMINING LAW OF DISMISSAL] 3, 8 (Fumio Ōtake et al. eds., 2002).  In 
sum, this provides bargaining power to workers since employers will pay some extra compensation to 
workers who resign voluntarily. 
86
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 482-83.  
87
 See, e.g., Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] Oct. 29, 1979, 330 RŌDŌ HANREI 71, 78-79 
(Japan) (indicating that the doctrine of abusive dismissal rights is applied to the cases of adjustment 
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custom of employment adjustment was firmly established.  At least in the 
large companies in Japan, dismissal was avoided by restricting overtime 
work, suspending mid-career hiring, transferring and farming out workers to 
related companies, terminating the employment of non-regular workers, and 
soliciting voluntary retirement by old workers.88 Dismissing typical workers 
was not regarded as the first option employers should take in recessions. 
 The Doctrine of Abusive Dismissal requires the four conditions 
below in the case of adjustment dismissal:89 
(1) the urgent necessity of dismissal for the survival of the firm, 
(2) fulfillment of duty of efforts to avoid dismissal, 
(3) propriety of the selection criteria for the dismissed,  
(4) procedural reasonableness. 
 Condition (1) is the presupposition for adjustment dismissal.90  In 
judging condition (1), Japanese courts have taken a view that adjustment 
dismissal should be reasonable means to resolve present or future deficits.91  
As mentioned above, even when there are deficits, courts held that 
adjustment dismissal was only a solution if reasonable efforts to avoid 
dismissal were taken.92  Thus, in the court’s view, employers should first 
search for a way to avoid adjustment dismissal.93  With regard to condition 
(3), if there are no objective standards for the selection or if the standards are 
deemed objectively unreasonable, the adjustment dismissal will be void.94  
Condition (4) virtually implies the duty to explain and consult with the labor 
                                                                                                                              
dismissals); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 27, 1983, 427 RŌDŌ HANREI 63, 64.  See also Yamakawa, 
supra note 85, at 8-9. 
88
 Courts recognize that workers normally expect continual employment and firms employ workers 
on the premise that workers would expect so.  See, e.g., Fukuoka Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.], Oct. 
24, 1979, 427 RŌDŌ HANREI 64, 65-66 (Japan); Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] Mar. 31, 1993, 
629 RŌDŌ HANREI 19, 23 (Japan). 
89
 See, e.g., Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] Oct. 29, 1979, 330 RŌDŌ HANREI at 78-79. See 
also SUGENO, supra note 55, at 487-89. 
90
 See, e.g., Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Ōsaka Dist. Ct.], May 8, 2000, 787 RŌDŌ HANREI 18, 27 
(Japan) (indicating that necessity for adjustment dismissal had decreased and invalidated the dismissal). 
91
 See, e.g., Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] Oct. 29, 1979, 330 RŌDŌ HANREI at 78-79. 
92
 See, e.g., id. at 78; Fukuoka Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.], Oct. 24, 1979, 427 RŌDŌ 
HANREI at 64; Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Ōsaka Dist. Ct.], May 8, 2000, 787 RŌDŌ HANREI at 28.  
93
 But this does not mean that employers should test literally all available means before dismissing 
workers for adjustment.  See, e.g., Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.], July 23, 1999, 775 RŌDŌ 
HANREI 71, 80-81 (Japan) (rejecting the argument of plaintiff workers that defendant firm could have taken 
means other than adjustment dismissal such as work sharing on the ground that those means did not seem 
to function well in the defendant corporation). 
94
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 489. 
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union in good faith, and is consistent with the method of employment 
adjustment of Japanese firms stated above.95 
When the disputed dismissal is judged as being void, the employer 
must pay the wages for the period in which the worker was dismissed.96  
Contrary to European countries, the option to end the employment 
relationship without the agreement of the worker, but in exchange for the 
payment of some compensation when the dismissal is judged as void, is not 
permissible in Japan.97 
The doctrine has its foundation in the basic principle of Civil Law that 
prohibits the abusive exercise of rights.98  Lower courts began to utilize the 
principle for solving dismissal cases during and after 1973 Oil Shock.99  In 
the late 1970s, the Supreme Court finally endorsed the doctrine.100 In 2003 
the doctrine was codified in the Labor Standards Law,101 and the provision 
has been moved into new Employment Contract Law that came into force on 
March 2008. 102   
D. The Long-Term Employment Relationship as Relational Contract 
The LTER is also incomplete in terms of aspects other than 
employment duration, due to its nature as a relational contract under the 
conditions of bounded rationality. 
First, the LTER takes the form of a group contract, the contents of 
which are specified by the work rules (shūgyō kisoku), which generally 
apply to all workers in a firm.103  In most developed countries, the outline of 
the rules of a firm is regulated by the minimum standards set by the 
                                           
95
 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
96
 For the legal effect of invalid dismissals, see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
97
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 27. 
98
 See MINPŌ [CIV. C.], art. 1 para. 3. 
99
 For the formation of doctrine of abusive dismissal, see Yamakawa, supra note 85, at 4-7. 
100
 E.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1975, 29 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 456, 457-58 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 1977, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17, 18-19 
(Japan). 
101
 Before the 2003 amendment, the Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 
18-2 provided: “A dismissal shall, where the dismissal lacks objectively reasonable grounds and is not 
considered to be appropriate in general societal terms, be treated as an abuse of that right and invalid.”  Id., 
translated in LABOR STANDARDS ACT 13 (Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training trans., 2003).  For 
a brief summary of doctrine of abusive dismissal and 2003 amendment, see Nakakubo, supra note 80, at 
13-18.  For more on the new Employment Contract Act, see infra note 102. 
102
 Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 16.  This provision is 
identical to the former article 18-2 of Labor Standards Law that was deleted from Labor Standards Law 
according to the legislation of new Employment Contract Law.  See id. at supplementary provision art. 2. 
103
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, arts. 89, 92-93; Rōdō Keiyakuhō 
[Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 7. 
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collective bargaining at the industry level, and the co-determination system 
between employer and workers’ council decides the details of the rules.104 
In Japan, the employer has the power to set the work rules105 and this 
is the basic norm in the LTER.  The Labor Standards Law requires every 
employer to frame work rules with regard to the main items106 and to make 
them known to all workers.107  The framing and the change of work rules 
must be submitted to the public agency known as the Labor Standards 
Inspection Office (Rōdō Kijun Kantokusho) so that they are supervised as 
being subject to the legal regulations and collective agreements among 
employers and workers.108  As such, the work rules substantially govern the 
labor contract. It is therefore important for workers to reflect their opinions 
within its content.   
Although it is obligatory for the employer to seek the workers’ 
opinions in Japan,109 it does not mean that employees (or union(s) of the 
firm) have veto power regarding changes in the work rules.  If there is an 
agreement to change working conditions between workers and the employer, 
the changes will be effective.110  In principle, if the amendment of the work 
rule is against the workers’ interest, it is necessary to gain the consent of the 
workers.111  However, if an amendment is against the interest of workers, 
employers can unilaterally amend the work rules when the following two 
conditions are met.112 
First, the workers must be informed of the amended work rules that 
reflect the change in working conditions. 113   The second, and more 
important, condition is that the amendment of the work rules must be 
reasonable considering various factors, including the necessity of the 
                                           
104
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 495-96. 
105
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 90; Rōdō Keiyakuhō 
[Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 7.  See also SUGENO, supra note 55, at 115-19. 
106
 Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 11; Rōdō Kijunhō 
[Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 89, paras. 1-10. 
107
 Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 106, para. 1; Rōdō Kijunhō Shikō 
Kisoku [Ordinance for Enforcing Labor Standards Law], Ministry of Health and Welfare Ordinance No. 23 
of 1947, art. 52-2. 
108
 See Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 11; Rōdō Kijunhō 
[Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, arts. 89, 92, para. 2. 
109
 Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 11; Rōdō Kijunhō 
[Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 90, para. 1. 
110
 See Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 8. 
111
 Id. at art. 9 (providing that except for the case where the conditions provided in article 10 of the 
Employment Contract Law are met, the workers cannot change the work rules against the interest of the 
workers unilaterally). 
112
 Id. at art. 10. 
113
 Id. 
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changes in working conditions, extent of the disinterest workers will suffer, 
and the process of amendment.114  In reality, the work rules are framed and 
revised through negotiations with the labor union, since the implementation 
of these rules is impossible without the labor union’s support. 
Japanese employers are required to protect employment intensely 
because of both social norms and legal doctrines.  In exchange, they gain 
discretion to set the work rules based on working conditions, personnel 
affairs, and enterprise order and discipline. 
E. Working Conditions 
Japanese labor law has avoided much intervention and given 
employers large discretion to control personnel matters and enterprise order 
and to discipline workers.  This has been the basis for accumulating firm 
specific investments through OJT and other means in Japanese firms.  The 
effects of the related laws are briefly summarized below. 
First, firms have a freedom of recruitment, and Japanese employers 
have significantly more discretion in this aspect115 than those in the United 
States, wherein legislation on discrimination in the labor market is 
developed and thus discretion in hiring and recruitment is constrained.116 
Although there are some restrictions on freedom at this stage in Japan,117 
                                           
114
 Id.  This is based on the case law about the changing of work rules.  See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] Dec. 25, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 3459, 4363-64 (Japan) 
(indicating that change of the work rule must be reasonable and affirmed the change of the defendant 
corporation in order to introduce mandatory retirement age); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 28 1997, 51 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 705 (Japan) (in affirming the judgment of Tōkyō High 
Court, the Supreme Court held that the change of work rules which extends the mandatory retirement age 
of defendant bank from fifty-five to sixty but in turn reduces the wages is valid.  In this case, before the 
work rules were changed, defendant bank had already hired employees between the ages of fifty-five and 
fifty-eight on conditions that were substantially similar to the working conditions just before the mandatory 
retirement, and therefore the change of work rules could be considerably disadvantageous to the 
employees.  The court affirmed the change on the ground that the necessity of the change was so large, the 
wage after the change is still high compared to other firms, and the defendant bank’s union had negotiated 
and agreed on the change).  Article 10 of Labor Contract Law codified the summary of these case laws.  
See Takashi Muranaka, Rōdō Keiyakuhō Seitei no Igi to Kadai [The Significance and Problems of the 
Legislation of Employment Contract Law], 1351 JURIST 42, 43-45 (2008).   For the cases of work rule 
changes involving reduction of wages, see infra notes 123, 124 and accompanying text. 
115
 See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 12, 1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1536, 1543-46 (Japan) (in remanding the case to Tōkyō High Court, the Supreme Court 
indicated that in principle, article 14 of the Constitution, which prohibits discriminatory treatment, does not 
restrict the discretion of firms in hiring and recruitment stage and thus investigating and asking about a job 
candidate’s political ideology is not illegal). 
116
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 60-62. 
117
 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law prohibits gender discrimination at the time 
of recruitment and hiring.  Koyō no Bunya ni Okeru Danjo no Kintōna Kikai Oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni 
 
548 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 3 
 
 
discriminatory treatments based on other features (e.g., political ideology) 
are not deemed void under the case law.118 
Following recruitment, it is customary for Japanese firms to require 
active human capital investment by workers through OJT.  The demand for 
OJT is linked with frequent rotations to train in various types of jobs.  
Employers have broad discretion regarding personnel reassignments, at least 
for typical workers whose work place or job type is not explicitly restricted 
by an employment contract. 119   Sometimes, a worker opposed to a 
reassignment may be punitively dismissed.  The law supports the system by 
admitting the employers’ right to order and conduct OJT.120  Note that giving 
employer’s substantial discretion with regard to personnel affairs in itself 
does not directly lead to serious financial damages for employees since the 
Japanese wage payment system is not strongly associated with the type of 
job or location of the office.121 
F. Wage Payment 
With regard to the other aspects of working conditions, wage payment 
is clearly the most important matter.  One legal restriction is the regulation 
of minimum wages.122  But for the wage payment system in the LTER, 
again, the autonomy of the management and laborers is broad.  
During the Oil Shock and the 1990s recession, a drastic change in 
wage payment was often required for the survival of firms, and this 
unexpected change was frequently contested.  The courts flexibly accepted 
this adjustment by considering the “reasonableness” of the revision of work 
                                                                                                                              
Kansuru Hōritsu [Equal Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972, art. 5.  See supra notes 75-
79 and accompanying text.  Also, imposing conditions on an applicant’s age during recruitment is basically 
prohibited.  See Koyō Taisakuhō [Employment Countermeasures Act], Law No. 132 of 1966, art. 10. 
118
 See supra note 115.  It is understood that employers have broader discretion in hiring and 
recruitment under Japanese law compared to the laws of the United States or the European Union. See 
YUICHIRO MIZUMACHI, RŌDŌHŌ [LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW] 136-39 (3d. ed. 2010). 
119
 See, e.g., Fukuoka Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.] July 30, 1996, 757 RŌDO HANREI 21 
(Japan) (finding that there was no restriction of job types for the plaintiff employee and therefore the 
reassignment was valid), aff’d, 757 RŌDO HANREI 20 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 10, 1998). 
120
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 132-36. 
121
 See supra Part II.A. 
122
 In Japan, there are regional (for each prefecture) minimum wages and industrial minimum wages 
based on an investigation by the Minimum Wage Council (Saitei Chingin Shinsakai).  See Saitei Chinginhō 
[Minimum Wage Law], Law No. 137 of 1959, art. 16 (Japan).  Employers must, in principle, pay at least 
these minimum wages to workers, see id. at art. 5 para. 1, and the Labor Standards Inspector (Rōdō Kijun 
Kantokukan) has the authority to investigate, inspect, and question in order to ensure the performance of 
employer duties.  Id. at art. 38. 
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rules on payment.123  One basic rule is that employers may change the wage 
system, at least if it is judged indispensible to protect the employment of 
workers.124 
One significant rule which functions as a regulation on real wages in 
Japan after the late 1980s came from the regulation of working hours.125  
The Japanese Labor Standards Law that established the 48-hour work week 
system was substantially revised in 1987 and with gradual reduction of 
working hours, by 1997, the principle of the 40-hour work week was put 
completely into practice.126  When employers require overtime or rest-day 
work, employers must make an agreement with the labor union (or the 
representative of majority of the employees in the office) and must file the 
agreement with the Labor Standards Inspection Office. 127   In addition, 
employers must pay a wage premium for such work.128  Although it has been 
said that Japanese workers are overworked, working hours have 
continuously declined since the end of the 1980s because of the new legal 
regulations and the beginning of the recession.129 
                                           
123
 See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 25, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
3459, 4363-64 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 28 1997, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 705 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 7. 2000, 54 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2075 (Japan) (denying the effect of work rule amendment that resulted in the reduction of the 
wage for workers only who are above fifty-five).  For the law on the change of work rules, see supra notes 
104-114 and accompanying text. 
124
 See, e.g., Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Ōsaka Dist. Ct.] May 28, 1997, 1641 RŌDŌ KEIZAI HANREI 
SOKUHŌ [RŌKEISOKU] 22 (Japan) (affirming the reduction of wage as part of reconstruction of defendant 
corporation, the court affirmed that there was no objection by plaintiff and the reduction was not against 
public policy.  On the other hand, the court denied the effectiveness of cut of plaintiff’s wage allegedly was 
due to the poor result of his job.)  See also ARAKI, supra note 20, at 52-55.  But in contrast to minor 
changes of work rules, it is not so easy to reduce the wage unilaterally.  See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. 
Ct.] Sept. 7. 2000, 54 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] at 2093-94. 
125
 See generally SUGENO, supra note 55, at 259-60. 
126
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 32, para. 1 (Japan) (providing 
that “an employer shall not have a worker work more than forty hours per week”).  See also id. at art. 32, 
para. 2 (providing that “an employer shall not have a worker work more than eight hours per day for each 
day of the week”).  
127
 Id. at art. 36, para. 1. 
128
 Id. at art. 37, paras. 1, 3. 
129
 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHŌ [MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE], HEISEI 19 NEN-BAN KŌSEI 
RŌDŌ HAKUSHO SHIRYŌHEN [2007 WHITE PAPER ON WELFARE AND LABOR: DATA APPENDIX] 118 (2007) 
(Japan).  In reality, it is very difficult to compare the working hours of different countries because of the 
difference of rules and the nature of statistics.  As a reference, the White Paper on Welfare and Labor 
provides the data of the yearly working hours of the production workers in manufacturing in various 
countries in 2004.  According to this data, workers in Japan and the United States work for approximately 
1950 hours, those in the United Kingdom work for about 1900 hours, and those in France and Germany 
work for about 1530.  Id.  With regard to this data, the working hours of Japanese workers are still much 
higher than those of the workers in European countries. However, it is coming closer to the level of the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  Id. 
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G. Labor Unions and the Dispute Resolution System 
As the LTER is an incomplete contract, there is always a chance for 
dispute concerning contract interpretation.  The following are the two types 
of dispute resolution systems: bargaining and negotiation organizations, and 
public agencies for the arbitration of the disputes.  
In the former resolution system, the most important player is the labor 
union. The recent density of Japanese labor unions is below 20%.130  This is 
much lower than the post-war rate of 50%.131  However, the density is higher 
than that in other developed countries such as France or the United States, 
wherein the union density is around 10%.132  Japanese labor unions are 
enterprise unions.133   Though they often join an industrial federation of 
unions, industry-level collective bargaining is not common.134  In the case of 
an industrial union, the negotiation aims at setting the criteria for generally 
regulating the labor conditions in the labor market.  In contrast, Japanese 
labor-management negotiations mainly deal with intra-firm disputes.135  In 
particular, after 1960, when the enterprise unions136 began to establish the 
cooperative labor-management relationship and strengthened their 
management participation functions, Japanese labor unions grew closer in 
substance to the workers’ council in Europe than to the European labor 
unions. 
Japanese labor union law strongly protects the right of labor unions, 
reflecting a legislative intent immediately after the war to promote labor 
rights.137  These rights consist of the right to organize, bargain collectively, 
and take collective action.138  These days, explicit collective actions are rare, 
and collective bargaining has been replaced with more informal negotiations 
known as “labor-management consultation.”139  However, these rights of the 
                                           
130
 See id. at 140. 
131
 Id. 
132
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD EMPLOYMENT 
OUTLOOK 2004 145 (2004). 
133
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 500. 
134
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 164.  
135
 Note, however, that by using Shuntō (Spring Wage Offensive), labor unions also coordinate 
enterprise-level negotiations for the yearly increase in wage rates to a reasonable level, while adjusting it to 
the macroeconomic conditions of the year.  See, e.g., REBICK, supra note 28, at 77-79. 
136
 Even in small firms wherein labor unions do not exist, joint labor-management committees often 
exist; these committees perform the same role.  See id. at 81-82. 
137
 See Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor Union Law], Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 1 (Japan) (providing that the 
main aim of the Law is “to elevate the status of workers by promoting their equal standing with their 
employers in bargaining”). 
138
 See id. at art. 6. 
139
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 179-80. 
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labor unions definitely hold the effect of a threat point in negotiations, and 
have served to promote the position of laborers. 
Agreements between workers and employers formed through labor-
management negotiations are either established as collective agreements 
(rōdō kyouyaku), which are superior to work rules,140 or induce changes in 
the work rules.141  
When the parties cannot resolve disputes themselves, public agencies 
engage in arbitration.  In the case of collective disputes, the Labor 
Commissions (Rōdō Iinkai) intervene.142  Although it is a part of public 
administration, its members are chosen from the outside, such as academics 
or lawyers and representatives of unions and employers, 143  and its 
independence from the bureaucracy is guaranteed.144  The basic principle of 
the Labor Relations Commission is to respect labor-management autonomy, 
so it usually does not compel resolution of disputes.145  Though they order 
remedial measures to rectify the consequences of unfair labor practices, it 
has no prosecution division.146  Owing to the development of the labor-
management consultation system, the number of cases dealt with by the 
Commissions is diminishing.147 
Individual disputes may go on to civil litigation.  As Japan does not 
have a special Labor Court, the disputes are treated as normal civil cases.  
The most important feature of individual disputes in Japan is the small 
number that are actually litigated:  only 2000-3000 civil cases related to 
labor disputes are filed in the district courts every year.148  This is in sharp 
contrast to European countries, such as France and Germany, where 
160,000-600,000 cases are handled every year by the Labor Courts.149 
Japan’s lower litigation rates, compared to other western countries, 
can be explained by high litigation costs due to the small number of lawyers 
and judges, and by the fact that systems promoting out of court agreements 
                                           
140
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 92, para. 1 (Japan). 
141
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 114-15. 
142
 See Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor Union Law], Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 20 (Japan). 
143
 Id. at art. 19, para. 1. 
144
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 191-93. 
145
 See SUGENO, supra note 55, at 673-74. 
146
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 193-94. 
147
 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHŌ, supra note 129, at 140. 
148
 See Saikō Saibansho Jimusōkyoku Gyōseikyoku [Administrative Affairs Bureau, Supreme Court], 
Heisei 19-nendo Rōdō Kankei Minji, Gyōsei Jiken no Gaikyō [Outline of Labor Relations Civil and 
Administrative Cases for 2007], 60 HŌSŌ JIHŌ 2421, 2447 (2008) (2246 cases were filed in 2007. From 
1998 to 2007, 1708 to 2519 cases were filed each year). 
149
 See id. at 375. 
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have developed. 150   In the case of labor disputes, labor-management 
consultations and administrative schemes to promote pre-trial agreements 
are particularly well developed. 151   With the addition of high costs of 
litigation, everything possible is done to prevent disputes from going to 
court. 
H. Labor Market Policy 
Finally, it is worth looking briefly at the labor market policy in Japan.  
In addition to the Doctrine of Abusive Dismissal,152 other laws and policies 
dealing with the labor market also emphasize the protection of employment 
as its basic objective.  For this purpose, the law explicitly states the need for 
active intervention by the government in the labor market.153  In practice, the 
policies mentioned below are important.154 
First, private employment agencies had been strictly regulated. 155  
Instead, Public Employment Security Office, a public agency, in principle, 
had monopolized placement and vocational guidance activities.156  Second, 
unemployment benefits are provided to help unemployed workers.157  Third, 
financial support is also offered to promote the employment of elders,158 and 
handicapped people, 159  partly for the purpose of providing equal 
                                           
150
 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and 
Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989).  Haley first argued that the low number of court 
cases in Japan was due to institutional factors such as the low number of lawyers and judges, rather than 
using a cultural explanation.  John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 
(1978).  For an analysis from a political perspective, see, e.g., Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: 
Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 L. & SOC. REV. 651 (1990). For a survey of related 
arguments and empirical analysis on factors behind increase in litigation in Japan, see Tom Ginsburg & 
Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant?: An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation (Ill. L & 
Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE04-009, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=608582. 
151
 See supra notes 137-147 and accompanying text. 
152
 For the doctrine of abusive dismissal, see supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text. 
153
 See Koyō Kankei Chōseihō [Employment Measures Law], Law No. 132 of 1966, arts. 1, 3-4 
(Japan). 
154
 For a survey of the Japanese law in the labor market, see SUGENO, supra note 55, at 31-73. 
155
 See supra note 72. 
156
 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 6 (Japan).  
157
 See generally Koyō Hokenhō [Employment Insurance Law], Law No. 116 of 1974 (Japan). 
158
 See Koyō Hokenhō Shikōkisoku [Rule for Enforcement of Employment Insurance Law], Ministry 
of Labour Rule No. 3 of 1975, art. 104 (Japan) (providing subsidies for certain employment of elders).  For 
a summary of Japanese Law concerning employment of elders, see Noboru Yamashita, Act Concerning 
Stabilization of Employment of Older Persons, 4(3) JAPAN LABOR REV. 71 (2007). 
159
 In essence, the Law for Promotion of Employment of Handicapped People provides that if a firm’s 
(only those that employ more than 300 employees) workforce is less than 1.8% handicapped, it will be 
required to pay penalties.  See Shōgaisha no Koyō no Sokushintō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Law for Promotion 
of Employment of Handicapped People], Law No. 123 of 1960, art. 53 (Japan); Shōgaisha no Koyō no 
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opportunities to workers.  Fourth, the employment measures are designed to 
support depressed industries and areas.160 
As the list of policies above shows, the support to the unemployed 
people and the subsidization for the protection of employment constitute the 
main body of the policies, reflecting its objective of promoting employment 
security.  Conventional wisdom of neoclassical economics categorizes the 
latter as the type of policy that simply preserves the inefficiency of the 
market, thereby impeding competition. 161   After the 2000s, when firms 
began active employment adjustment, and the unemployment rate 
approached the 5% level,162 Japan’s employment policy shifted its emphasis 
from protecting pre-existing employment to absorbing existing 
unemployment. 163   Drastic reform of the labor market law is now in 
progress, as will be shown in Part IV.B. 
IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL POLICY ON LABOR 
RELATIONS 
A. The Relationship Between Labor Relations and Labor Law in Japan 
The JEC and Japanese labor law developed in parallel after World War 
II.  Is it then possible to state that the Japanese labor law enforced the 
establishment of JEC?  As the basic principles of Japanese labor law suggest, 
the legal system and its principles were influenced by Western society, 
particularly the United States, after World War II.164  Therefore, it is difficult 
to say that those laws enacted through the reform after World War II 
themselves established the development of the JEC, which characterized the 
post-war Japanese employment system. 
Furthermore, Japanese labor law at least in part respects the autonomy 
of labor and management by establishing only a basic framework concerning 
                                                                                                                              
Sokushintō ni Kansuru Hōritsu Shikōrei [Ordinance for Enforcement of Law for Promotion of Employment 
of Handicapped People], Ordinance No. 292 of 1960, art. 18 (Japan).  In contrast, a firm receives subsidies 
if it surpasses the 1.8% quota of handicapped workers.  See Shōgaisha no Koyō no Sokushintō ni Kansuru 
Hōritsu [Law for Promotion of Employment of Handicapped People], Law No. 123 of 1960, arts. 49-50 
(Japan). 
160
 For the present situation concerning regional employment, see Minoru Itō, Measures for 
Supporting Regional Job Creation in Japan, 5(1) JAPAN LABOR REV. 85, 92-99 (2008). 
161
 See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 303-10 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that subsidies and 
differential tax treatment among production factors create deadweight losses to the overall economy). 
162
 See Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Employment and Unemployment Trends, WHITE 
PAPER ON THE LABOUR ECONOMY 2005 3-4 (2005), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/l-
economy/2005/dl/01-01.pdf.  
163
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 31-32. 
164
 See GOULD, supra note 30, at 106-16. 
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industrial relations.  There are not many laws that enforce or even point 
toward the JEC, and hence, it can be said that the labor laws only set the 
frame and the base of the autonomous negotiation, under which the LTER 
had been developed spontaneously.  In other words, labor laws somewhat 
restricted party freedom to contract by setting the minimum standards, or by 
regulating negotiation methods, but the LTER is something that emerged 
within that restriction as a set of contracts (in the economical sense).  This 
observation corresponds with our theoretical conclusion concerning the JEC 
in Part II.B. that the LTER in Japan can be regarded as an implicit contract, 
which continues for a long period and which is self-binding between 
employers and employees.  
In summary, the Japanese legal system has made important 
contributions as a sub-system to the social enforcement of the JEC merely 
through setting a reasonable stage for the mutual agreement between labor 
and management.  With protection of the right of workers and the autonomy 
of parties guaranteed by the legal framework, labor and management 
autonomously adopted the system of JEC as a type of implicit contract in 
post-war Japan. 
It may be noteworthy to mention a covert but important legal aspect 
for the establishment of the JEC.  The Japanese legal system for minimizing 
individual labor disputes has greatly contributed to efficient management by 
decreasing dispute costs to firms and protecting their power of discretion.  At 
the same time, however, it seems that the high cost of litigation and the 
social pressure for pretrial agreements have made it difficult to bring 
lawsuits.165  It has been argued that a new system of individual dispute 
resolution, which is more accessible to individual workers, should be 
organized.166 
B. Adjustment of Labor Relations and Labor Law to the Structural 
Change of the Economy After the 1990s 
Following the 1990s, the merit of the JEC diminished because of 
active technological innovations.  Firms were required to shed unwanted 
labor to cope with the long-run macroeconomic stagnation.  Therefore, it 
                                           
165
 See Kazuo Sugeno, Judicial Reform and the Reform of the Labor Dispute Resolution System, 3(1) 
JAPAN LABOR REV. 4, 5-6 (2006) (providing information on the low level of labor litigation in Japan). 
166
 See, e.g., id. at 8-12 (discussing the need for reform of the system for resolving individual labor 
disputes).  For labor tribunal system under Labor Tribunal Law (Rōdō Shinpanhō) of 2004, see Katsutoshi 
Kezuka, Significance and Tasks involved in Establishment of a Labor Tribunal System, 3(1) JAPAN LABOR 
REV. 13, 16-27 (2006). 
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was necessary to restructure the existing industries and develop new 
industries that embodied new technologies by using the market mechanism, 
including the migration of the labor force from old to new businesses and 
industries.  Rich empirical literature exists documenting the United States 
labor markets’ polarization of high and low-wage jobs induced from skill-
based technical changes; this is also the case in Japan.167  This tendency for 
the polarization of the labor market in Japan can be an indirect but 
persuasive empirical basis for the change of labor demand for the Japanese 
firms and the relative decline of the importance of the firm-specific skills.  
As shown below, while in some areas of the labor law this reform was 
actually put into effect, the regulation of labor relations and the labor market 
has been tightened in other areas, leading to the aggravation of distortionary 
effects on the economy.  This section discusses first the competition-
promoting change and the next section discusses the efficiency-decreasing 
regulations.  
The reform of the JEC by law was first put into practice by using its 
flexible legal structure.  As pointed out in the previous section, Japanese 
labor law does not reinforce or even push in the direction of an LTER as the 
typical employment relation in Japan.  It allows for various types of labor 
contracts.  In effect, more specific and individualized contracts than the 
LTER are allowed in present Japan.  The Japanese wage payment system 
based on seniority is also being reformed to reflect performance measures 
more directly168 and workers are willing to accept these changes.169  This 
change allows for richer options for workers and will be efficiency 
enhancing in the present economic environment, where technical progress, 
and the diversification of labor force to include female workers, middle-aged 
and older workers, and foreigners deepen rapidly.  
In the area of labor market law, more explicit reforms are currently in 
progress.  To cope with the rapid change in the economic environment, 
Japanese labor law has recently begun to emphasize the activation of the 
external labor market by the deregulation of the private employment agency 
                                           
167
 See, e.g., David H. Autor, The Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 189 
(2006). For the labor market in Japan, see Toshie Ikenaga, Rōdō Shijō no Nikyokuka: IT Gyōmu no Dōnyū 
to Gyōmu Naiyō no Henka ni Tsuite [Polarization of the Japanese Labor Market: Adoption of ICT and 
Changes in Tasks Required], NIHON RŌDŌ KENKYŪ ZASSHI, No. 584, at 73 (2009) (showing similar 
polarization in the Japanese labor market during 1980-2005). 
168
 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHŌ [MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE], HEISEI 19NEN-BAN RŌDŌ 
KEIZAI NO BUNSEKI [ANALYSIS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2007] 105-08 (2007) (indicating that making wage 
more reactive to worker performance has become popular). 
169
 See ARAKI, supra note 20, at 70-73. 
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business and public support to the vocational training provided to the 
unemployed.170  The law for subsidizing employment in depressed industries 
has been abolished171 and instead a subsidization policy related to newly 
created industries such as those pertaining to information, environment, 
medicine, and welfare industries was implemented.172  At the same time, 
unemployment benefits are enhanced in order to provide a safety net to cope 
with increasing unemployment. 
It can be said that the present employment policy in Japan not only 
uses the JEC to protect employment but also supports the adjustment ability 
of the external labor market mechanism and tries to integrate these two 
previously distinct policies to establish full employment. 
C. Potential Sources of Economic Distortion by Legal Regulations on 
Japanese Labor Relations 
In some other areas, the direction of present Japanese labor law 
emphasizes the direct regulation of the labor relations rather than respecting 
their autonomy. 
First, the regulation of wages is likely to reduce the efficiency of the 
economy.  One such direct legal restriction is the minimum wage 
legislation,173 wherein a considerable amount of resource allocation waste 
has been created for allocating labor for small business and part-time 
workers.174  With respect to workers covered in the LTER, a more significant 
regulation of real wages was the result of the reduction in working hours.  
According to recent influential empirical research, some significant part of 
the slowdown of the Japanese economy in 1990s can be explained by this 
                                           
170
 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHŌ, supra note 129, at 223-28 (explaining measures for vocational training). 
171
 Tokutei Fukyō Gyōshutō Kankei Rōdōsha no Koyō no Antei ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Sochihō [Law 
on Special Measures Concerning the Stabilization of Employment in Specified Depressed Industries], Law 
No. 39 of 1983 (Japan) was abolished in 2001.  This abolition was a part of reform of the labor market law 
in 2001 which in turn was in line with the deregulation policy of Japan after bubble economy. 
172
 Koyō Taisakuhō [Employment Measure Law], Law No. 132 of 1966 (Japan) was amended.  This 
amendment was also a part of the reforms of 2001.  See KAZUO SUGENO, SHIN-KOYŌ SHAKAI NO HŌ 
[EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND LABOR LAW] 88-93 (Supplemented ed. 2004).  For more information on the 
reform of regional employment laws, see Itō, supra note 160, at 88-91 (explaining policy and legal changes 
concerning regional employment after 2000). 
173
 For law regarding minimum wages, see supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
174
 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 322-55 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the 
welfare implications of the legal regulation of the minimum wage). 
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regulation.175  So it is difficult to justify further regulations to shorten work 
hours from the viewpoint of efficiency. 
Let us consider the economic effects of the Japanese employment 
security more in-depth.  First, consider the effect on the allocation of labor 
among various firms and industries, and second, the effect on the 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital.  Under the frictionless 
neoclassical competitive labor market, the effect on the allocation of labor is 
neutral to resource allocation including the unemployment rate, since the 
strict protection of workers is completely offset by the reduction of wage 
rates. 176   However, it is sometimes difficult to make such adjustment 
smoothly.  For example, when firms require rapid restructuring because of 
the unexpected change of the economic environment, firms are usually 
constrained by labor law not to make drastic reduction of wages.  In such 
cases, firms are required to hire unwanted high-cost labor so that the 
allocation of labor should be distorted by the employment protection. 
Next, considering the effect on firm-specific human capital, there is a 
widespread belief that employment protection enhances the incentive of 
workers to make such investment.177  As long as the development of firm-
specific human capital is unverifiable to the courts, a worker will make less 
firm-specific investment anticipating opportunistic behavior by an employer.  
If so, the employment protection by law may enhance efficiency by 
deterring an employer from betraying the worker who made sufficient firm-
specific investment.178  But in reality, workers protected by the employment 
protection law have no incentive to make such an effort, since their job is 
legally protected without any effort.179  So, punishment was necessary for 
the workers who did not accumulate firm-specific human capital.   
                                           
175
 See Fumio Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade, 5 REV. ECON. 
DYNAMICS 206 (2002) (suggesting that the strengthened legal restrictions on working hours significantly 
contributed to the slowdown of the macroeconomic performance of the Japanese economy in the 1990s). 
176
 See Edward P. Lazear, Employment-at-will, Job Security, and Work Incentives, in EMPLOYMENT, 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR UTILIZATION 39, 46-52 (Robert A. Hart ed., 1988). 
177
 See, e.g., Hiroyuki Chuma, “Kaikoken Ranyō Hōri” no Keizai Bunseki [Economic Analysis of the 
“Doctrine of Abusive Dismissal”], in KAISHAHŌ NO KEIZAIGAKU [THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW] 
425, 444-50 (Yoshiro Miwa et al. eds., 1998). 
178
 For pros and cons of the laws restricting dismissal, see Takashi Araki & Fumio Ōtake, Kaiko Kisei 
[Regulations on Dismissals], in KOYŌ SHAKAI NO HŌ TO KEIZAI [LAW AND ECONOMICS IN LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS] 4, 15-24 (Takashi Araki et al. eds., 2008).  Employment protection is sometimes 
justified from viewpoints other than economic efficiency, such as protection of civil rights or fairness.  
While we do not deny values other than economic efficiency, it should be noted that protecting existing 
workers from dismissal might be attained only at the cost of potential workers who do not yet have jobs.  
See id. at 19. 
179
 See Lazear, supra note 176, at 54-56. 
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In the absence of a method other than dismissal for this punishment, it 
is true that employment protection destroys that innate efficiency in the JEC 
discussed in Part II.B.  However, it is possible to punish the workers by a 
reduction in wages, demotion, or by suspending the employee’s expected 
promotion.  In this case, the employment protection policy is again neutral to 
resource allocation.  In other words, if we are to maintain the employment 
protection in the form of restricting dismissals, we need to give employers 
some means other than dismissal in order to offset the shortcoming of the 
regulation.  As discussed above, the regulations on working conditions have 
been strengthened since the 1980s.180  In view of these extended limitations 
on the discipline of workers, tight employment protection is more likely to 
be a factor in diminishing the efficiency of the Japanese labor relations in the 
accumulation of firm-specific human skills.  This is because those 
regulations may distort distributions of resources by raising costs of 
disciplining and reassignment of workers. Also, this makes it difficult for 
Japanese firms to move workers from obsolete industries to growing ones.  
In a time of rapid change in technology and economic structures, these costs 
are not small.  Even when a law does not change the actions of employers 
substantially, it nevertheless may impose costs because employers make 
efforts to circumvent the regulations.  So together with economic situations 
in the 1990s some of the labor law reforms led to economic inefficiency. 
All in all, the overall development of regulations on working 
conditions and employment seems to have made it more difficult for firms to 
restructure, and for labor market to allocate labor force among various 
industrial sectors more appropriately, impeded the accumulation of new 
skills of workers, and barred new industries from entering the market due to 
the increase in labor cost.  As its consequence, more unemployment and the 
substitution of regular workers with part-time workers occurred, particularly 
in the younger generation.  With regard to this it is understood that “freeters” 
are not simply a continuation of the system of non-regular workers, but are a 
product of the recession in the 1990s.  Though the recession itself was 
caused by macroeconomic fluctuation that is not related with employment 
custom or labor law, the stagnation hit younger workers disproportionally 
                                           
180
 We do not regard reforms of regulations against sexual discrimination at the stage of hiring forced 
Japanese firms to hire unwanted female workers. When Equal Employment Opportunity Law was amended 
in 1997 to mandate equal treatment at the employment stage, the employment rate of women in Japan had 
already been increasing. In this case, the law reflected the reality and adapted to it rather than changing it.  
For the backgrounds of amendment, see Yamakawa, supra note 24, at 637. 
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because of strict employment protection regulations.181  In this sense, labor 
law matters to the “freeter” phenomenon. 
Main empirical research on the effect of employment protection on 
labor market performance has confirmed that employment protection causes 
a negative effect on the labor market. 182   Given these empirical 
contributions, it seems to us that the strengthening of the employment 
security that developed after the 1970s in Japan caused welfare loss to the 
Japanese economy. 
D. Changing JEC in Broader Contexts of Japanese System  
In recent Japan, it is argued that not only JEC but also other traditional 
features such as cross shareholdings, keiretsu and main bank system are 
under change. 183  Although this article does not deal with those features 
themselves, they are briefly mentioned. 
First, some empirical research shows that changes in other aspects 
have led to changes in employment customs. 184  As long as this holds, 
changes in JEC are accelerated by complementarity among institutions.  
Second, there have been arguments on whether Japanese system is 
totally changing or not.185  Although it is difficult to conclude decisively at 
this moment, it is important to understand that JEC is gradually adjusting to 
changing economic environments.  As indirectly indicated in the fact that 
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labor market in Japan is polarizing,186 firm specific skill is becoming less 
important.  Therefore, long- term employment may well decrease, but not 
disappear, reflecting this change. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article discussed the functions of the Japanese labor law in 
relation to the Japanese system of labor relations, which is referred to as the 
JEC.  This article first described and analyzed the characteristics of the JEC.  
In the LTER that prevails in Japan, workers must follow orders from the 
employer with respect to OJT and other personnel affairs, enterprise order 
and discipline.  Employers are, in turn, committed to the permanent 
employment of workers and appropriate payment of wages for their efforts, 
without depending on the managerial environment.  This efficient outcome 
is characterized by a high level of accumulation of firm-specific intellectual 
skills and low unemployment. 
 Since this system is in principle realized as a self-enforcing social 
equilibrium, it is not enforced directly through the Japanese labor law.  
However, in several aspects, the Japanese labor law has served as a 
subsystem to support this efficient social equilibrium.  First, Japanese 
employers are, by law, allowed more discretionary freedom for controlling 
laborers than the employers in the West.  This facilitated the capability of 
employers to reassign workers and increase investment in firm-specific skills 
through OJT.  The limited access of workers to litigation also served to 
protect this system.  Second, labor-management autonomy remains broad 
with regard to dispute resolution, so that legal regulation and arbitration are 
not actively pursued.  This principle made it possible to realize the efficient 
reputation equilibrium through the long-term relationship between unions 
and employers.  
 At present, it is unclear whether the JEC will prevail in the future.  If 
it is not the case, one possibility is that Japanese firms may not protect this 
custom by reneging on the payment of the workers’ effort, pursuing 
short-run profit.  Then, the JEC will be transformed into a neo-classical 
competitive market system.  It might be the case that the labor market 
allocation of human resource may be even superior to that by an internal 
labor market in the present economy, since firm-specific human capital is 
relatively less important in the present economic situation.  If this is the case, 
this transition is favorable for the efficiency of the overall economy.  In this 
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case, however, appropriate legal measures should be considered as a safety 
net for workers who belonged to the LTER but were reneged on the payment 
for their efforts. 
 Another possibility is that Japanese workers may demand more 
comfortable working conditions, while protecting the legal regulations on 
employment security.  In this case, Japanese employment society might 
converge to an economy with lower productivity and a higher 
unemployment rate especially for young generations. 
 In any case, as long as the JEC is the product of the 
labor-management autonomy, which was not directly enforced through law, 
it is unlikely for the law to have a decisive power for its protection in the 
future.  However, it is important that the law should not have a negative 
efficiency effect through inappropriate legal intervention in labor relations.  
For the sake of efficiency, it is much more reasonable to leave much room 
for the individual agreement between workers and employers.  At the same 
time, employment security measures should not be chosen to preserve the 
unproductive sector of the economy, impede the development of new and 
productive industries, and to rescue unwanted or unmotivated workers.  
Given the need to extend the regulation on the working conditions, 
particularly with respect to equal opportunity policies for sexes, ages, 
nationalities, and rapid technical innovation, the relaxation of the protection 
of employees is necessary for the discipline of laborers and sectorial 
adjustment in Japanese employment society in the near future. 
